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PREFACE 
Recent technological achievements of the Soviet Union 
have startled A~erican public opinion into a belated 
re cognition of some of the deficiencies of public education. 
Circumstances now f avor the introduction of more rigorous 
course work into secondary-school curricula. In the first 
chapter of this thesis, the educational point of view of 
the author and the educational aim of the study are both 
shown to correspond, to a large degree, with the prevailing 
mood of more intensive high-school education. 
Following the initial chapter, the main body of the 
study i s intended to provide background material for the 
teaching of the EUropean Common Market as a social study 
resource unit. Two full chapters pertain to relatively 
abs t ract discussions of the economic aspects of customs 
union. The heavy emphasis upon economics is, the author 
feels, in keeping with the nature of the European Common 
Market . It is an economic organization. Furthermore , the 
author feels that the best way, if not the only way, to teach 
e conomics is to repr~duce the reasoning emp1oyed by the 
economists themselves. 
In the fourth chapter the EUropean Common Market is 
_,_v-
/ 
analyzed in the framework of the economics of the preceding 
two chapters. United States influence on the development 
of the organization is stressed. To round-out the presentation, 
attention is directed to non-economic aspects of the problem. 
Concluding the study is a chapter dealing with one possible 
historical treatment of customs union. 
Since the thesis is intended to provide background 
material for teaching students to understand the European 
co~mon Market and its implications, the emphasis is upon 
the asking of appropriate questions. A thesis that would 
attempt to answer the questions would be quite a different 
sort of study. 
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CHAPTER I 
CONCER.NING THE TEACHING OF TB.!ft SUBJECT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET 
1. Preliminary Comment 
This chapter has to do with the reasons for i ncluding 
the European Common Market in the social studies curricula 
of secondary schools and with some of the proolema inherent 
in teaching the social studies. For the most part, the 
author feels that it is more useful to discuss the underlying 
philosophy of education in the social studies than to 
enumerate a long list of more or less unrelated obj ectives 
to justify the teaching of the Common Market. In view 
of the involved nature of the subject matter and the 
extensive range of abilities of students, no attempt is 
made to provide the r eader with a guide to methods of teaching 
t he content of the thesis. It seems more approprl ate to 
rely upon the experience· and common sense of the teacher 
to select the best teaching method for his own students. 
2. A current Perspective for 
Secondary School Education 
Trend of American Education.-- As twentieth century 
advances in technology have increased productivity and 
ushered an era of relative plenty into existence, the 
-1-
aims ot American education have been subjected to much 
scrutiny. Emphasis has tended to be centered upon the 
individual and his adjustment to society as he finds it. 
"Child-centered" programs of study have replaced " subj ect-
centered" curricula. ~,a:rent-teacher aesociations have 
focused their attention upon the happiness of little 
Johnny as an indi vitlual rather than upon the society in 
which little ·Johnny will live as an adult. PPotagonists ot 
the conflicting concep~that fundamental knowledge mus t 
be taught t o enable students 1to recognize reality and to 
I 
s tand up t o it,have been derided as espousers or middle-
! 
I 
class. values. The pursuit o4 truth, the development of 
orderly thinking ability, and the respect for learning 
I 
I have tended to be replaced b1 the overpowering goal of 
good social adjustment. The ~ United States has in fact, 
if not in intent, concentrat i d its educational effort 
upon producing happy, pleasant citizens rather than 
I 
disciplined, productive work, rs. 
2 
Opponents of the trend 1f education in the United States 
have couched their arguments,! for the most part, in terms 
of their ethical values or i J terms of their disparaging 
I 
estimate of the success of t~e · mode:rn>school , programs. , They 
have pointed to Christian et~ics and to history to substantiate 
. I 
the view that hard work, sel~-sacrifice, and lofty ideals 
. . . I 
are requisite characteristic, of individuals . of any society 
that is to prosper. In many lof their arguments it is po.ssible 
I 
i 
j 3 
to det ect the implication that there is something improper 
about the degree of emphasis upon the pursuit of happiness 
in the classroom. Statistics of many types have been used 
by these critics to substantiate their contention that in 
its avowed goal of producing well-adjusted citizens, American 
education has been failing. A great many of the faculty members 
of the nation's colleges and universities have been among 
these critics of American public education trends. Few of 
the critics, however, have made a blunt attack on the 
propriety of emphasizing the individual and not the society 
in American education. The basic motivating philosophy, that 
the individual is of pre-eminent importance, is so deeply 
ingrained that people rarely bother to subject the concept 
to re-evaluation. 
Impact of Russia on American Education.~-- To the person 
who has assimilated the culture of the Engl!sh-speaking world, 
there can be no doubt that · the ' ilidividual should be the 
ultimate consideration in social philosophy. There can, 
however, . be serious doubt about the great emphasi s accorded 
the individual and the minuscule emphasis given to society 
in current American education. A new force now exists in 
the world to give immediate urgency to a change of emphasis 
in American education. That force is the public recognition, 
in this country, of the strength and power of the Soviet 
Union. At the present time the Unit ed States cannot afford 
the luxury o~ preoccupation with the good +i~e. 4 For the sake 
o~ national survival American schools must now produce 
disciplined1 productive workers even if they find it more 
gratifying to concentrate upon social adjustment and 
individual happiness. The Soviet Union is ,introducing the 
world to a new concept in capital for.matio~. It employs 
i 
a Spartan code of national self-sacrifice to direct its 
output much more to production goods .' than to consumer goods. 
In such a fashion it expects to overtake and surpass the 
productivity of the United States. Soviet leaders are 
convinced that American power and success in the twentieth 
century has resulted mostly from the great preponderance 
of industrial power which America has possessed. They also 
believe that their own educational system is developing a 
nation wi th a stronger sense of unity than that which ~xi sts 
in the Uni t ed States. 
A change of educationaLdirection is necessary to equip 
American youth with the mental apparatus with which it can 
appraise problems and vote sensibly. There is no need for 
a subversion of cardinal American principles to occur in the 
process. On the contrary the foundations upon which the 
thinking of future citizens should be based lie in the subject 
matter of a curriculum which contains both necessary knowledge 
and which imparts a thoughtful point of view. In the crucially 
important field of social s cience, the necessary background 
for incisive thinking can be obtained only through the methods 
5 
which have been worked out and the knowledge which has been 
accumul~ted within the subjects themselves. It is not enough 
for the teacher to recite findings of the social sciences; 
it is i mperative that he inform his students of the methods 
of inquiry which the social sciences have developed. 
Otherwise the superficial platitudes which the student accepts 
as part of his knowledge are apt to serve hLm poorly. Of 
course, not all students have the capacity to learn even the 
simple methods of the social sciences. Hopefully, thos e 
who are unable to learn can be taught the value of learning. 
If a large proportion of the electorate can not be knowledgeable, 
it should at least be sympathetic to knowledge. 
3. Problems of Teaching the Social Studies 
Complexity of social science.-- Social science is 
inherently one of the most difficult divisions of learning 
with which the student has to cope. Many secondary school 
courses in social studies are so deficient that the student 
neither gains an appreciation of the issues involved nor of 
their complexity. There is too much to be taught in the time 
available, and many of the issues are so divorced from the 
student's experiences and interests that he finds them dull. 
Teachers have difficulty in making their social studies 
courses include the necessary breadth without rendering 
them d evoid of depth. To interject enough content, when 
too much has to be taught, is a very difficult problem; to 
provide good organization is virtually impossible under the 
circumstances. 
The only reasonable solution to social study course 
organization is to reduce the number of topics and to choose 
only those topics of the greatest relative value, both as 
tools to develop rigorous thinking and as elements of the 
student's later store of knowledge. It should not be 
forgotten that the topic choice should be related to the 
student's s ense of need and value. If the student is made 
to conceive of himself as a responsible member of society, 
it is ,not difficult to convince him that vital problems 
affecting the society demand his consideration. The manner 
in which the selected topics are taught is hardly less 
important than the selection of the topics themselves. 
The -classroom presentation colors the student:s understanding 
of the subject matter and influences the conclusions he draws. 
Both the knowledge the student obtains and the thinking 
processes he develops are inextricably associated with the 
instruction he receives. 
Social studies should present more than facts.-- More 
than factual knowledge is involved in the teaching of social 
studies. Some means must be used to organize and analyze 
the facts; a systematic approach is indispensable. The 
process of teaching must provide a fr~ework for analysis 
of general classes of problems if the student is to be left 
6 
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with the comfortable feeling of having learned a body or 
knowledge. Guideposts for reasoning and for compartmentalizing 
facts are an invaluable part of social studies. Without 
guideposts the student is left with cloudy, imprecise, 
unorganized notions of his classroom experience. 
The easiest, if the the only means of satisfying the 
above desiderata in the teaching of the social studies is to 
present the social sciences as the distinct subjects that 
they are. Their identity shoul d be maintained, and their 
~igorous thought process should be taught. To abridge their 
self-consistent theories is to expose the student to the 
danger of not recognizing pre~udiced and erroneous concepts. 
In some instances it is virtually impossible to comprehend 
social science concepts without retracing the argument used 
by the social scientists themselves. 
The reader should not construe the above discussion to 
mean t hat secondary school social s tudies should deal 
separately with each social science. On the contrary, it 
is probably desirable in high school to organize the social 
studies around carefully chosen topics pertinent to the 
crucial issues of the times. In the teaching of the topics 
no loose effort to find a means of introducing the specific 
social science subjects should be made. Instead, only those 
social sciences which must be employed to analyze the topic 
should be discussed. In such discussions the social science 
subjects should be treated adequately to analyze the issue 
at hand, and the student should be made aware of the body 
of knowledge with which he is working. The benefits of this 
type of approach are the stimulation of the student's 
interest by the use of likely topics and the systematic 
treatment of the topics by the employment of very useful 
frameworks of thought. It is better for the student to 
understand a few important social issues with reasonable 
clarity than to have a hazy, indistinct recollection of 
a whole panoply of issues. 
4. Use of the European Common 
Market in Social Studies 
Importance of European Common Market~~~ ~~~ 9rganization 
of this thesis has been guided by the above considerations. 
8 
The European Common Market was chosen as a current international 
phenomenon of great importance to the United states. Any 
young person who is exposed to the more serious output of 
the popular press c.an not avoid exposure to ·· frequent articles 
on the topic. The response of the United States to the 
proposed customs union may be of prqf.ound importance in 
determining the outcome of the struggle between the popular 
governments of the West and the more autocratic governments 
or communistic countries. The considerations involved in 
study of the Common Market inevitably include the whole 
foreign trade issue. Therefore, the Common Market as a 
social studies topic meets the two criteria stated above: 
it is of current interest and it is ot great importance. on 
both these scores it is a reasonable topic for inclusion in 
social studies curricula. 
Treatment of the Common Market~-- In treating the 
subject of the Common Market, the author ha~ endeavored to 
use fundamental economic reasoning. No attempt has been 
made to shy away from economics; after all, the Common 
Market is an economic organization of sovereign states. 
In keeping with the meager background possessed by the 
average secondary school student, the economic arguements 
have been made as simple as possible. If, however, the 
Common Market is to be worthwhile as a subject in social 
studies, there seems to be no way of avoiding an economic 
approach to it. Accordingly, there is no forced association 
between the Common Market topic and the economics in terms 
of which it is discussed. 
Many people question the desirability of teaching 
unadulterated social sciences in the high school on the 
grounds that secondary school students are not mentally 
equipped to handle the complex subjects. They argue that 
the social sciences are too complicated and too divorced 
from the student's experiences to make them useful parts of 
social studies curricula. In this thesis economics, in 
a relatively simple form, comprises a _good part of the total 
study. Therefore, if the economic part of the discussion 
9 
is too difficult to present to high school students without 
undue danger of confusing their thinking and robbing them 
of the will to le arn, the whole thesis fails to perform its 
function of providing background for a social studies topic. 
10 
Economics in high school.~~ In the latter part ot the 
nineteenth century when economics was becoming rather popular 
as a high school subject in the United States, the authors 
of the texts were naturally disposed to argue for the usefulness 
of their subject in high school. Pe~haps a ;Fepre sentative y 
quotation is the following: 
"For one, I am fully persuaded that it is as easy 
to teach political economy to students of 15, 16, or 17 
years of age, as it is to teach geometry or quadrat ic 
equations, which are actually taught, and with complete 
success, within that period of lite." 
At the time the statement was written, American public schools 
emphasized the discipline of learning more t~an the practical 
aspects which have come in vogue during the twentieth century. 
Recourse to the above quotation does not answer the question, 
however. The only means of determining whether or not 
economics can be taught satisfactorily in high school is to 
approach the matter philosophically and statistically. The 
philosophical problem lie s in defining what constitutes 
satisfactory t eaching and education. In other words, what 
is the purpose of education? In Europe the "public school" 
concept has tradit i onally held that it makes no sense to 
1/F. A. Walker, First Lessons in Political Economy, Henry 
Holt, New York, 1889, Preface, P• IV. 
educate a very large percentage o£ the populace since the 
great majority of youth do not possess the mentality to 
benefit from high school education. Conversely~ in the 
United States it has been held that it is every citizen's 
birthright to be educated through high school at public 
expense. The consequence has been a growing disparity 
between the rigorously trained "gymnasium" graduate of 
11 
the German school system~ for example, and the high school 
graduate of the American system. The for.mer has consistently 
been forced to meet high academic standards, while the latter 
has been exposed to a system characterized by many courses 
that provide an escape from academic rigor. There . can be 
no question that if' the emphasis is upon quantity .. in education 
at the high school level, quality must be sacrificed. The 
pertinent question is what sort of balance should prevail 
in the United States between quantity and quality. Everyone 
from the idiot to the genius, from the illiterate to the 
highly educated, can cast just one vote in the United States. 
If the country is to prosper, what sort of training should 
be provided in the high school? There is very little agreement 
on what the proper balance should be. 
Position taken by the author.-- The position taken in 
this thesis is that there is no excuse whatsoever for shielding 
any potential voter from reality. It is no enough for the 
school system to talk in vague terms about the American way 
of life. Instead the issues must be squarely faced. If the 
student fails to comprehend the vital aspects or t he 
important social problems, his future r easoning will be 
. based on precepts without foundation in reality. There 
i s no doubt that a significant percentage of the s tudents 
do not have the mental ability to understand the more 
complex problems, but education is a fr aud if it shields 
them from a knowledge of their deficiencies. Since nature 
has imposed intricate social relationships on mankind, 
and since all the citizens vot e to decide how the United 
Stat es will conduct its affairs, there is no escape f r om 
the logical necessity or faci~g up to the issues in t he 
classroom. 
The statistical aspect of the question of whether or 
no t economics can be taught satisfactorily in the cla s sroom 
ari ses because of the great range of abilities on the part 
or t he students. The exi s tenc e of the range of aptitude 
for le arning and its attempted measurement by I. Q. t e sts 
re q~ire no elaboration in this thesis. Learning and 
r easoning are matters of d egree. All students gain at l east 
some small comprehension of the subject matter paraded befo:re 
them in the classroom. It seems more appropriate to run the 
risk of stretching the ability or those in the l ower portion 
of the distribution too far than to take the chanp~ of 
applying too little stimulus to the students in the upper 
part of the distribution. Otherwise the nation will fail 
12 
to make maximum use of its human assets, and students will 
leave schoo]_ with little respect for erudition. In the 
atmosphere of shock that has followed Sputnik I in the 
United States, the time is rife for putting more intellectual 
content into secondary school education. 
13 
Organization of ensuing chapters.-- The ensuing chapters 
of this thesis are intended to provide background material for 
inclusion in social studies curricula. Chapter II deals with 
economic reasoning indispensable tor analyzing customs union. 
Chapter III applies the economics of Chapter II to the general 
analysis -of customs union issues. Chapter IV uses the material 
of the preceding two chapters to analyze the European Common 
Market. The thesis is concluded with a chapter that has to 
-· 
do wi t h an historical view of customs unions as a means .for 
gaining insight into the probable course that the Common 
Market will follow. 
CHAPTER II 
AN ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK FOR CUSTOMS UNION ANALYSIS 
1. Economic Background or 
High School Students 
Economic illiteracy on the part of the American people 
is an outstanding problem or the twentieth century. Dominance 
or the United States in world affairs inexorably demands that 
the nation provide solutions to vital economic problems. 
Somehow the basic question of what is to be accomplished must 
be determined. Subsequently the means or attaining the desired 
goals must be established. In this second phase economic 
problems are of inestimable importance. 
The high school teacher cannot assume that her students 
understand the facts of economic life. .All his life the 
typical student lives in an environment that is rife with 
economic falacy. On the rear windows of automobiles he sees 
placards bearing the message, "Made in Texas, by Texans, for 
Texans". In magazines and newspapers he reads of .America's 
rrgive-away" programs. If his parents are better educated 
than most, they quite likely will tell . him that some foreign 
trade is good and necessary, but they may be expected to 
caution him concerning the need to protect American workers 
-14-
and factori es against the competition of foreign goods 
made by workers who receive very low pay. In general the 
secondary school teacher should regard his students as the 
possessors of more economic superstition than economic 
knowledge. 
To dispell enough of the economic myths to permit some 
degree of understanding of the customs union issue, thi s 
first chapter hopefully provides, in a simple manner, a 
background of essential economic knowledge. If t he teacher 
succeeds in imparting an understanding of the~e elementary 
concepts to his students, he will have made a most i mportant 
contribution to their education. 
2. A Brief Description of Production 
Economists think of production as a process in whi ch 
labor and land are combined in different fashions to fo rm 
all of the material goods that man possesses. Of course, 
1 5 
the term "land" has a broad meaning in this context. It 
i ncludes all raw materials, all capital goods, and all 
i ntermediate goods in the production process. Each producer 
selects from among all the possible processes and combinations 
at his disposal that which is least expensive for each type 
and quantity of product which he wishes to make. Accounting 
methods are us ed to det ermine the relations between the 
value of _t he quantities of the materials wbi~h are: bought 
and the value of the quantities of gdods which are produced. 
It pays to increase the size of an operation as l ong as the 
cost of additional units of i nput is less than the value of 
the resulting additional outpute It suffices for the reader 
t o a ccept this statement as part of common sense, although 
the elaborate reasoning used t o justify it is part of the 
. Y law of diminishing returns. Because some costs, such a s 
16 
those of factories and other long-lived equipment, cannot be 
altered in a hurry, and because of increasing cost per unit 
of output as a plant nears capacity output, a graph of cost 
per unit of its product has a "U" shape ·- as shown i i.r Figure 1 . 
Figure 1. 
$/unit 
Q units 
Ave rage Cost of Output 
Under normal competitive conditions a plant cannot be operated 
at volumes of production much higher or much lower than point Q, 
which corresponds to lowest cost per unit of output. If a 
country has too small a market to absorb at least this minimum 
y Kenneth E. :t3oulding, Economic Analysis (Revised Edition), 
Harper and Brothers, New York, 1948, p.5o2. 
quantity of output, it cannot support a plant to manufacture 
the particular good in question. In the next chapter this 
fact is shown to be one of the motivating factors for the 
establishment of customs unions. 
3. Ef£ects of Trade on the 
Standard of Living 
17 
To understand the e£fects of trade, it is useful to 
consider first the limitations on a nation's possible 
production in the absence of trade. A fundamental limitation 
arises because of tbe different combinations of land, raw 
materials, labor, and oapital facilities which each country 
has at its disposal. These factors of production can be used 
to manufacture a variety of different types and quantities 
of: products. Figure II, which shows the various possible 
quantities of only two products, is a convenient pedagogical 
device to use in the explanation of this concept. The curved 
Figure II. 
meat 
A' B' C' steel 
Production Trans£or.mat1on CUrve 
line is called either a production possibility curve or a 
production trans£ormation curve. It is the locus of points 
which show the possible combinations o£ units o£ steel and 
units or meat that a. nation can produce using the most 
ef£icient processes available to it. Point A on the curve 
represents a combination of: A' units o£ steel and A'' units 
of meat. Point B is a combination o£ B' units of s te el and 
Bt' units of meat. The Figure shows that point B represents 
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a combination of more steel and less meat than point A. At 
each point on the curve a slight movement to a neighboring 
point r esults in the sacrifice of one of the commodit ies :fo_r 
more of' the other. The ratio of the quantity o£ the commodity 
given up to -· the quanti:tyof the commodity that i s gained is 
called the ratio of transformation. 
The concave-to-the-origin shape. o£ the production 
possibility curve follows from the law of diminishi ng re turns, 
to whi ch r efe r ence was previously made. Once again. common 
sense can be used to substantiate the diminishing returns 
argument. If a nation decides, perhaps during a war , to 
manufacture much more steel at the sacrifice of me at , workers 
would be .transferred in large numbers to the steel mills . 
Having spent all their lives in other pursuits, many of them 
would be less suited to steel manut'acturing . work than the 
professional steel ,workers. Overall efficiency would drop 
for this reason. Other reasons for a drop in effieienc~ 
would be the excessive use to which steel manufacturing 
equipment would be put, the cost of transporting worke r s 
and t heir famiiies long distances, the need for buildi ng new 
e quipment and new housing, and the need for using old mines 
with worked-over ore. As steel production is incr eased under 
these circumstances, a proportionally greater numbe r of units 
of me at would have to be foregone for each addit i onal unit 
l9 
of steel produced. This type of situation is illustrated by 
point C in Diagram II. At point C the ratio of t r ansfo1•mation 
of meat into steel is very high. Point A in Figure II i s just 
the converse of point c, while point B is intermediate between 
poinm A and B. 
Effect of an innovation of the transformation curve.-- If 
some new innovation, such as a new labor-saving or material-
saving invention, is introduced into the steel ind1~ try , the 
pr oduction_ possibility cur·ve is: moved outward as shovm by 
the dotted line in Figure III. The invention makes it possible 
Figure III 
meat 
;.._.----~-----=~·· ·· 
steel 
Production Possibility Curve After an Innovation 
for the nation to have more steel without giving up any 
meat. The dotted production possibility curve is superior 
to the solid curve that existed before the new invention 
improved efficiency in the steel industry. Note also that 
the ratio of transformation of meat into steel has decreased 
as a r esult of the invention. The changed conversion ratio 
implies that the nation has become relatively more efficient 
in steel production than in meat production. 
Comparative advantage argppent.-- Each nation has an 
unigue production possibility cur ve because no two nations 
have the same endowment of the factors of production. The 
curves in Figure IV show hypothetical production possibility 
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curves for the United States and Argentina. From the relative 
meat 
.... ~ ... ~ ...... 
\ 
u.s.A. 
Figure 4 
meat 
Argentina 
steel 
Hypothetical Production Possibili.ty Curves 
for the United States and Argentina 
shapes of the solid curves, it can be determined that the 
United States has a relative production advantage in steel, 
while Argentina has a relative advantage in meat. Note, at 
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this point, that absolute advantages are not stated to exist 
for either country. If the Unit ed Stat es wishes to transform 
meat into stee~ (i.e., if the United States wishes to divert 
factors of production from meat to steel), the number of 
uni ts of me a t which it must give up to get e ach additional 
uni t of ste el is larger than the number of units of me at 
tha,. t Argentina would have to do without to g et each additional 
unit of steel. In other words, the Uni t ed States, according 
to the solid curves in Figure 4, has a relative advantage 
over Argentina in steel, while Argentina has a relative 
advantage over the United States in meat. These r elative 
advantages can be expre ssed in t erms of' the ratios of 
trans formation for the two countries. 
The production possibil ity curves above we r e introduced 
t o assist in the explanation of the advantage of world trade. 
Since the discussion is simpler in quantitative t erms, assume 
that the transformation ratio, within the relevant range, is 
12 units of steel for 3 units of meat in the United States 
and 12 units of steel f or 9 units of' meat in Argentina. (These 
figure s are purely hypothetical and intended only to clarify 
the discussion.) In other words, the United States can make 
four units of steel for each unit of meat it is willing to do 
without, while Argentina can make only li units of steel for 
each unit of meat it sacrifices. Under what condi tions will 
trade of :steel and mea t occur between the two countries? 
certainly no trade will occur unless both parties involved 
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expect to benefit therefrom. Both the exporter and the 
importer must anticipate a profit, or no trading transactions 
will ensue. What is the range of price ratios of units of 
steel to units of meat that will be advantageous to both 
countries? To answer this question consider a p~;U"ticular 
exchange ratio of 12 units of steel to 6 units of meat. As 
stated above, with its relative advantage in steel production 
over meat production, the United States, in the absence of 
trade, must give up 4 units of steel to get one unit of 
meat. However, at the exchange rate of 12:6, the United 
States through trade would have to relinquish only 2 units 
of steel for one unit of meat. Conversely, without trade 
Argentina has to do without three-quarters of a unit of 
meat to get one unit of steel; through trade Argentina can 
e.btain one unit of steel for one half unit of meat. Consequently, 
both countries are handsomely benefited by mutual trade at 
the ration of 12:6. By repeating the above calculation fo r 
different exchange ratios, the reader can verify the fact 
that trade _is profitable to both countrie s at all price 
ratios between the internal conversions ratios of the two 
countries for the two goods traded. 
Not one word in the above argument has dealt with 
comparative _wage rates or worker productivity in the t wo 
countries. Nor has any part of the discussion been concerned 
with the possibility that one country is, in absolute terms, 
abl e to manufacture both meat and steel less expensively than 
the other. Instead, relative efficiencies only were used 
to prove the mutually beneficial results of trade. Only 
relative efficiencies are relevant to the argument. 
In later parts of this thesis reference will be made 
to the above demonstration of the value of international 
trade. Before leaving the topi~however, it is desirable 
to amplify the comparative advantage argument by saying 
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more about it. In the first place, it is a very old argument, 
having been first introduced by David Ricardo early in the 
!I 
nineteenth century. Secondly, it would probably be desirable 
to relate its explanation in the classroom to the case of 
a home owner who spends money to hire domestic servants 
to do housework which he can do more skillfully himself. 
His not doing the work should be attributed to his lack of 
time and his ability to ea~ much more per hour in his 
profession than he h~s to pay to have the house work done 
for him. In other words, division of labor justifies both 
domestic servants and international trade under the conditions 
hypothesized. 
4. Limitations of the Usefulness of 
the Comparative .Advantage Argument 
All that has been said thus far has been laudatory to 
free trade. In this section a number of limited, but valid, 
counter-arguments of differing importance are introduced to 
1/ David Ricardo, The Works and Correspondence of David 
Ricardo, University Press, cambridge, England, 1951, pp.l28-150. 
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provi de the reader with the other side of the free trade issue. 
In t he next chapter the analysis is based primarily upon the 
extent t o whi ch customs union brings about fre e t rade or its 
oppos i te, protection. 
National self-su.fficiency.-- Perhaps the most f ormidible 
argument agai n st free trade is the matter of self- sufficiency. 
In the comparati ve advantage discourse above, i t was shown 
that each nation could benefit by trading the goods in which 
it possesses relative advantage. Concomitantly, specialization 
of production increases the dependence of trading nations 
upon each other. For example, the United State s h as never 
had a woolen industry which can compete in terms of efficiency 
with foreign competition. Given fr ee international trade, 
the domestic woolen industry would become defunct as American 
con sumers bought cheaper and better woolens fabrica ted abroad. 
In case of war the United States might be at a serious 
disadvantage without the ability to manufacture the woolen 
product s required in the conduct of the war. For t h e most 
part, this national aelf'-suffieiency argument is non-economi c. 
Before l eaving the topic, it is worthwhile to note that 
national security is one of the favorite reasons advanced by 
protectionists fo:r "t he imposition of tariffs ; Many economists 
advocate the use of subsidies rather than tarif'fs to perpetuate 
industries required by national defense. The more obvious 
recognition by the populace of subsidies is their advantage. 
While a tariff is a hidden form of regressive taxa tion, a 
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subsidy appears on the list of government expenditures f or 
all t o se e . Thus, there is more of a tendency fo r periodic 
r eview of a subsidy to determi ne whether or not it is justified. 
Free trade and employment.-- Another argument used to 
advocate pr·otection is one which has to do wi·th conditions 
of employment. Protection proponents sometimes state the 
i s sue i n two parts: . {1) free trade leads to unemployment, 
and {2 ) f ree t rade may reduce labor's share of t he national 
product. Part (1) of the argument is based upon the conditions 
of ove r - production or insufficient demand. Fr om time to time 
industrie s over-produce in the sense that they manuf a ctur e 
more of a product than is sold in the same period of time. 
The result is accumulation of inventories and a reduction of 
production out put. During the depression of the 1930 ' s ,· 
demand persisted at levels far below the nation'-s capa ci ty 
to produce f or such an extended period that many busines s 
men concluded that t he cond i t ion was one of the economic facts 
of life . Later, following World War II, just the opposi te 
condi t i on of great demand and insurficient supply existed for 
a ··nti.mbe r of years. Analysis of the validi ty of t he under-
consumption theory is much too involved to be taught in · 
t he s econdary school or to be discussed in this paper. ·· Qn 
the other hand, , the sub ject cannot be arbitrarily ~ dism1~ sed . 
If free trade does lead to serious unemployment, the whole 
compar ative advantage argument used above to demonstrate, the 
advantage of free trade loses its validity. The r eader will 
. I 
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recall that in the comparative advantage discussion, it was 
tacitly assumed that each participating nation makes full use 
of its re sburces, including labor. Under those condit i ons,, 
it was shown that international trade has the effect of 
increasing productivity to enlarge the total quantity of 
production of the world. Without full employment, the logical 
first step to increase national output is to employ the able 
and willing workers who are out of jobs. 
In periods of the business cycle in which under-consumption 
is a problem, it is true that additional domestic employment 
can be stimulated by a country which succeeds in exporting 
considerably more than it imports. The mechanism by which 
employment is creat~d is not only the work required to 
manufacture the goods sent abroad, but it is the cumulative 
effe ct of the goods and services bought by the people who 
earn and spend the additional money that exporting presses 
.v into circulation. The worker in the export industry spends 
most of his salary, which goes to merchants, utilit ies, . and 
similar, non-export industria~ with the result that all 
economi c activity in the country is stimulated. However, 
not all countries can succeed in exporting more than they 
import at the same time. In times of depression, particularly, 
countries engage in a competition in prot e.ctionis t ic t rade 
policy. The r esult is that the attem,pt.ed: cure makes matters 
1/ A!vin H. Hanson, Business Cycles and National Income, 
w. l • Norton and Co., Ne?tYork, 1951, pp • . 14'7-171. .' 
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far worse _by precluding the COOiparative-advanta.~e benefits 
of free international trade . Internal fiscal and monetary 
policy may be used by governments to alleviate their cyclical 
unemployment problems without l"estricting their internat ional 
trade . 
Note that the previous paragraph p ertains to short- run 
conditions only. Protectionism has no validity as a long-
run, permanent cure for unemployment. To make matters worse, 
prote ctionism in times of depression, when it is mos t apt to 
occur , is quite likely to spread the area of the: depression 
to countries which are now<so<thickly populated that wi thout 
trade they must starve. Some of' these thickly populated 
countries are allies of the United States. 
There can be no doubt that a swing to free trade by 
countries formerly imposing tariff barriers may cause a 
t r ansition period of unemployment. In the same fashion a 
new invention causes unemployment as the areas and the 
industries using the old techniques give way to the new. 
This type of transitional change is one of the prices any 
economy must pay for higher productivity and higher living 
standards. Ideally the transition period f rom protection 
to fr ee trade can be made easier by the greater opportunities 
provided by a boom in the economy. The hardships that the 
dislocations indured can be alleviated, in any case, by 
government a l action. Injured parties can be aided by part of' 
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the gain that free trade bring s to the nation. 
The second argument enumerat ed above in favor of protection 
is int ende d t o appeal to labor. The statement i s made that 
free t rade may r educe , r elatively or absolutely, the share of 
t h e national product that goe s to labor. Theoret i cally , 
labor ' s share may b e r educ ed, but i t may al s o be i ncreased. 
Since t he gener a l s tandard of living is raised by the benefits 
of f r ee trade , there is much more r eason t o bel i e ve that , at 
least in absolute terms, labor will be benefited r ather than 
injured by the over-all change. The interested r eader may 
!I 
consul t Chapter VI of J. R. Hick's The Theqry of Wages for 
an analy s i s of the r easoning involved in t he di s t r i bution of 
the national product. Hicks concerned himself with dis t ribution 
chang es caused by inventions, but the same reasoning ca n be 
carri ed over t o change s wrought by a swing toward free trade. 
Free trade tends to increase the wage s of dome s t ic worke~s 
to t he level of the high-paying, producti ve , healthy i ndustries 
that can compete internat ionally. It is i n the mar gina l , 
barel y profi t able industries that workers earn the lowes t 
s alaries . 
Motivational a ssumpt i on s of above arguments . - - To c9nclude 
t his chapter on the economic analysis of customs uni on, it 
is des i rable t o emphasize sharply the motivational as sumptions 
on ·which i t ha s been based. Underlyi ng all t h e dis cussi on 
h a s been the notion that indi viduals and nations are i nterested 
primarily in i ncre asing their r eal income and real wealth. 
1J J . R. Hicks, The Theory o:f Wages,. Pet er Smith, New York, 
Y948 , PP • 127-130. 
In our world people possess no such single-mindedness or 
purpose. Inst ead, certain people are much more interested 
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in spreading the domain of communistic dominance; others want 
only to spread the gospel of individualism; a few still want 
nneutschland Tiber Alles"~ many think of nothing but apartheid; 
a numb er are concerned only with the well-being of Texas, or 
perhaps, only San Antonio, Texas. Such non-economic goals 
often assume such proportions that their advocates would 
gladly lose income or wealth to achieve their aims. 
CHAPTER III 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CUSTOMS UNION 
In the preceding chapter the economics of free trade 
and pro t ectionism are set fo r th in sufficient detail to 
permit t he r eader to use the two concepts in an analysis of 
customs union. In this chapter, after a short descri ption 
of one manner in which r e source distribution is changed 
between t wo business firms, much us e is made of the free 
trade versus protectionism arguments in a general analysis 
of what conse quen ce s are likely to follow customs union. 
Severa l addi tional economic concepts are i n troduced i n the 
chapt er, but an effort has been made to explain t hem in .such 
simple t erms that they will be understood by a per son no t 
previ ou s ly f amiliar with them. 
1. An Example of How Allocation 
of Resourc es Can Be Changed 
An e conomist would characterize a customs union as a 
d evice .f or changing the allocation of scarce re sources . In 
other words, he looks at a customs union as an arrangement 
which make s it possible for certain industries or firms to 
repl ace, either partially or completely, other exis t i ng 
industries or f i rms . The manner in which t his di s placement 
occurs in free economies is through changes in the relat ive 
pri ces and quantities of the finished goods . various companies 
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sell and through the prices and quantities of the things 
which they buy. To understand this process, consider an 
example. Suppose a steel firm has been operating profitably 
in a country which has had an import duty on foreign steel. 
Suppose in the same country an automobile company has been 
purchasing steel from the domestic firm, whose prices have 
been lower than that of fo r eign competitors facing the tariff 
on their products. If the country in which the two firms 
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are located joins a cus t oms union with other countries in which 
steel is produced less expensively than by the domestic steel 
firm, the automobile company will transfer its steel purchases 
away from the domestic firm 'to firms which, without the tariff, 
can offer the cheapest prices. So long as the market for 
automobiles either remains cons tant or increases in size, 
the automobile firm's profit increases as a result of lower 
cost of steel. At the same time the steel company finds 
its sales volume diminished and its profit reduced. In fact, 
if the lower-cost steel companies in the other member _countries 
of the customs union are large enough to produce all the steel 
n eeded in the customs union, the domestic steel producer 
will be forced out .of business. 
As the above example shows, the working of the price 
system in the free economy alters the flow of the resources 
needed for production just as certainly, and perhaps far more 
efficiently, than could any governmental edict in a planned 
economy. 
2. Resource Allocation Possibiliti es 
in Customs Union 
Customs union and resource distribution.-- What sort 
of change of flow or distribution of scarce resources can be 
expect ed from a customs union? More specifically, does 
customs union cause resources to flow tow8.rd or away from 
low cost producers: (a) in each individual customs union 
country, (b) in all member countries combined, (c) throughout 
the nations of the world outside the customs union, and (d) 
throughout the world as a whole? (The issue of possible 
differences between money cost and real social cost cannot 
be dis cussed at this point .without unduly lengthening the 
exposition. The interested reader can consult Pigou's, 
1/ 
The Economics of Welfare.)- By answering this question for 
the different types of resource allocation changes th.at 
customs -union ,can conceivably bring about, it is possible 
to go a long · way toward solving the general questi on of the 
~conomic effect s of customs union. The limitations Qf this 
approa ch to the problem will be enumerated later in this 
chapter . Most of the following part of t he analysis is to 
2/ 
be found in Professor Viner'~ The Customs Union I s sue .-
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Illustrative cases of resource allocation.-- Five different 
types of resource allocation changes are considered below. 
1/ A. c. p!gou, The Economics of Welf'are·, MacMillan and Co., 
London, 1952, pp. 1-37. 
g/ Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue, Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, Ne~ __ York, 195o, PP• 41-81. 
In each case care is taken to determine whether resources 
flow toward low-cost producers (the free trade goal) or 
t oward high-cost producers (the protectionist goal). At 
all times it is assumed that business firms will buy from 
the lowest-cost sources of supply in order to gain highest, 
possible profits. 
Case 1. Goods are imported after customs union, but 
they were not previously impo~ted because the protected 
domestic price was previously lower than the foreign price 
plus the duty that existed before the customs union removed 
all duties ainong member countries. It should be clear that 
the goods are now imported because, without the old duty, it 
is cheaper for domestic firms to import than to buy in their 
own country. This typ~ of result is a transfer of resources 
away from high-cost produ~ers toward low-cost producers. 
Case 2. After customs union, goods are imported from a 
country within the union rather than a lower-cost producer 
in a country outside the customs union. Before the customs 
union , the goods were imported from lower-cost producers 
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that can no longer . compete .· be cause of: ;,the· · c .onnnon~ ·. customs .. :union 
tariff discrimination against them. This situation allocates 
resour ces toward high-cost producers and is consequently 
protectiopist in nature. 
Case 3. Customs union causes one member nation to begin 
to i mport a good which was completely excluded by a sumptuary 
duty prior to the customs union. A sumptuary duty is one 
which is so high that for all practical purposes it .precludes 
all trade. This sort of change can be toward higher-cost or 
lower-cost producers. Which it is depends upon whether or 
not the source of the good within the customs union is a 
higher-cost or a lower-cost producer than alternate sources 
of supply outside the customs union. The import of the good 
may in itself be good or bad for the country. This is the 
sort of question which generally is best answered by the 
political process. 
Case . 4. The new common schedule of tariffs is on the 
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average somewhat lower than the average of the tariff schedules 
that existed prior to the formation of the customs union. The 
answer as to whether t~is type of average lowering of tariffs 
leads to gr~ater free trade or greater protection is very 
difficult to determine. In the first place it is virtually 
impossible to determine whether or not one tariff schedule 
is lower or higher than the average of another schedule or 
set of schedules. The intricacies of weighting and index 
numbers render this type of problem virtually insoluble. 
y 
To fur ther complicate the answer to the problem is the fact 
that the lowering of one tariff, while another is kept fixed 
or lowered proportionately less, may actually result in more 
protection rather than more free trade. This seemingly 
anomalous possibility arises when the duty is lowered on a 
v ner, "The Measurement of the 'Height'" of Tariff 
evels 11 , The Improvement of Commercial Relations Between 
Nations, Joint Comm1ttee:Carneg1e Endowment and International 
Chamoer of Commerce, Paris, 1936, pp. 58-68. 
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factor of production used in the manufacture of a product 
on which the duty is lowered less or not lowered a t all. 
Such a differential change in tariff rat es increases the 
profit of the manufacturer of the finished product. If the 
manufacturer happens to be a high-cost producer, the lowering 
of a duty thus results in increased protectionism. 
One is forced to conclude, even on the basis of this 
superficial discussion, that whether greater or less free 
trade or protectionism follows from a general lowering of 
tariff schedules in a customs union, below the average of 
the individual member countries' schedules prior to the union, 
is generally indeterminate. Even in the case of specific 
investigation of a particular customs union, this question 
is very likely to be unanswerable. 
Case 5. After customs union, the total quantity of trade 
i s greatly increas ed, each member country tending more to 
specialize in production. This situation is one ,:of the · 
t ypesof change the free trader wishes to bring about. 
I ncrea sed quantity of trade helps those who participate in 
i t, . injuring no national group. Convers ely, t r ade which is 
just shi fted from one nation to another hurts the one and 
a s si sts the other. For the society as a whole, t he n e t effect 
is good . or bad depending upon the relative efficiencies of 
the los er and the gainer in the change ·of fl ow of trade e 
The _above five cases show that the general reasoning 
employed can lead to no definitive statement as to whether 
customs union tends to foster free trade or protectionism. 
In the case of a specific customs union quantitative data 
can be gathered to assist in the analysis. The u se of 
empirical data will be discussed later in this chapter in 
the section pertaining to me~~urement. 
Before proceeding to the next topic, it is desirable to 
summarize the answer to the question posited about resource 
d i stribution o.n page thirty-three. If a high level of free 
trad,e eharacterizes customs union: 
(a) At least one member country gains. 
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Some member countries can incur a disadvantage. 
All member countries may benefit. 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
All member countries combined must benefit. 
The whole world benefi t .a .. in the aggregate. 
The countries outside the customs union incur 
a disadvantage i n the short-run and possibly 
in the long-run. 
If the primary effect of the customs union is protectionist: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
At least one member country must lose. 
Some member countries may gain. 
All member countries may lose. 
All member countries combined must lose. 
The whole world suffers a net loss. 
Countries outside the customs union lose. 
3. Some Qualifications to the Above Analysis 
Economies of scale and external economies.~~ One of the 
primary reasons given by indus trially backward countries for 
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de siring to form c~stom unions is the possibility of their 
taking advantage of the lower costs that large size sometimes 
makes . possible. On this issue of economy ot: scale prodigiou~. 
amounts of thinking and writing have been lavished. (The 
best bibliographical re.ference to this subject is probably 
. y 
to be found in Professor Chamberlin's Monopolistic Competition.) 
The theoretical possibility of economies of scale has been 
established unequivocally. Closely ~ssociated to the concept 
of economies of scale are . those ·pertairi.ing:·'!:;o ·infant-1ndust:ries 
and external economies. The central idea encompassed by these 
concepts is somewhat akin to the old adage that "nothing succeeds 
l ike success". Large factories are necessary for efficient 
productim-.. , in many industries if the advantages of division 
of labor are to be gained and if specialized equipment is to 
be used. A good example of the need for size in some plants 
is the assembly line. External (to the firm) econom· e s appear 
when industry in a region has grown sut:ficiently to permit the 
installation of better roads for the common use of all t:ir.ms, 
or when there arise enterprises that supply and service industry 
at lower cost than before. These benefits, which accrue to firms 
at no cost to themselves, arise only when there is sufficient 
concentration of indust~y to ma e them feasible. If a country 
is too small, there !s liklihood that the total national 
market is too small to support t:irms of such size that they 
1/ Edward Has"Eings Chamberlin , The T,heory of. Monopolistic 
~omgetition, Harvard Universi ty Press, Calii'br !dge, Mass .• , . 
195 • . 
can take advantage of lowest-cost manufacturing methods or 
of external economies. For such countries customs union is 
one conceivable method of incr easing the size of the market. 
Although the theoretical argument of' the existence of 
increasing returns to scale is elegant and i r refutable, 
there are strong reasons f'or believing that its quanti tative 
importance f'or small countries is not great. Empirical 1/ . 
studies - have shown that the optimum size plant in most 
industrie s i s small i n comparison to the giant firms tha t 
exist in most technologically ... advaneed countries. In a 
s cale of ascending firm size, there is a point above which 
size and efficiency are not positively correlat ed . The 
existence of the giant, multi-plant firms can be explai ned 
on other grounds than productive efficiency. Virtually 
impenetrable barriers to the entry of new competi tion protect 
some old firms and permit their continued growth. A list of 
such barriers includes: patent protection or secrecy; lack of 
knowledge , ~know-how", on the part of would-be entrants; 
control of raw materials or skilled labor by exist ing fi rms; . 
higher borrowing rates and inaccessability to equ ity markets 
f or would-be entrants; product preferences built upon years 
of national advertising; and unavailability of the very large y 
amounts of capital necessary to enter some industrie s. For 
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1/ s. s. Alexander , "Effect of Size of Manufacturing 
~orporations on th~ Distribution ~f the Rate of Return", 
Review of Economics and Statist1cs ·~ , (August, 1949), 31:229-235. 
~ Joe s. Bain, Barriers to New Comletition, Harvard 
University Press , Cambridge, Mass., 956. · 
the purposes of this paper, it is auffic1ent to state that 
giant firms, owning many separate m~ufacturing plants, are 
not appreciably more efficient, or indeed as efficient, as 
firms consisting of a single plant of optimum size for low-
cost manufacturing. Consequently, the economy of scale 
argument as a reason for customs union is admissable only 
with reservations. 
Tariff~bargaining power on the part of participating 
nations is another motivation for the establishment of 
customs union. A small nation whose trade is rela tively 
unimportant often cannot negotiate terms of trade .favorable 
to itself'. If such a small nation joins a customs union, 
its bargaining power may be improved. The larger the area 
encompassed by the customs union, the more likely. will be 
the need for non-member nations to trade with nations within 
the union and the smaller the need for member nations to 
trade with countries outside the cus toms union. This fact 
.follows from the uneven distribution of resources over the 
surface of the earth. A customs union is therefore much more 
apt to be able to manipulate exchange rates in its favor by 
unilateral changes of its tariff than its individual ~ember 
nations acting alone. This ability to bargain in strength 
through numbers is definitely a protectionist aim. Like 
other protectionist practices, it can benefit some nations, 
but only at the expense of others. 
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4. The Measurement Problem 
and the Weighting Problem 
guantitative issues.-- In the above discussion of 
economi es of scale, the theoretical argument was declared to 
be beyond reproach, but the reader was cautioned against 
placing too much credence in . economies of scale as a reason 
favoring customs union, on the grounds that the actual 
quantitative effect 1s probably small. It would be an 
omission not to extend such quantitative consideration to 
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the rest of the above discussion of customs union. To this 
end, it is necessary to attempt to determine which of the 
various possible effects of customs union are most probable. 
Is the net result likely to be in the direction of protection 
or free trade? W1lich nations are likely to be·nefit, which are 
likely to be ,damaged, and by how much? These questions can 
be answered only as they apply to a particular customs union. 
To make matters worse, even in regard to a particular customs 
union, many measurement problems impose almost insuperable 
problems. Part of the difficulty lies in the many variables 
that have to be simultaneously considered. Experimentation 
to change some of the variables and note the effect on other 
variables, while the majority of variables are held constant, 
is almost always impossible. Cause and effect become a very 
confusing problem to the researcher. Also, the aggregate 
measurement problem, which has to be handled by statistical 
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probability methods, is almost always present. Al l these 
compli ca tions can only be mentioned in a pape r of th~ s t ype. 
Suffice it t o s ay that quantitative esti~ation of the relative 
effects of any particular, proposed customs union is a t ask 
that require s schola;r-ly treatment of exceptional competence. 
5 . Ef f ects of Resourc~ Allocation Changes on 
the Individual and on the Nation 
Ina smuch as it changes the allocation of r esour ces , a 
customs union · inevitably creates grave social problems . Even 
if the re sult ant effect is a gain for all member nations and 
for the world, some people will suffer a s the change is 
brought about. Furthermore, the adversely-affected people 
are 11.kely to be u seful, productive citizens who have ad justed 
admirably to theirbus i ness environment. High-cos t pr oducers 
in a part icular country may be superior entrepreneurs to more 
favorably situated managers of foreign firms which replace 
them . The swath cut through ent erprises by the removal of 
tariffs i s ., often· ·cut with ve~y - ·little . respect for 4 abili ty. 
Condition s entirely beyond the control of management may 
render a firm ' s cos t higher than that of a f ore i gn competitor. 
Is i t proper to permit a nation to gain in the aggr egat e while 
certain of its innocent citizens p·ay the price of l os s .of 
their livlihood? 
In theory a nation could compensate t he unf ortunate s for 
their l os se s out of additional aggregate income which a ccrues 
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to t he nation as a result of customs union. This s olution 
to t he problem would leave no one worse off and e veryone 
bett er off. In actuality, however, it would be extremely 
difficult for the best-intentioned nation to e quit ably 
compensate its citizens who sustain a loss. The me asur ement 
of t he value of a business inescapably depends upon it s 
f uture prospects. The value of a busines s ls, in fact, 
the estimated stream of its future earnings discounted by 
an -appropr iate interest rate. Since man has not been 
grac ed with an ability to for esee the future, the value 
of any business i s subject t o wide divergencie s of opinion. 
Of course, the same sort of pr oblem exists in the establishment 
of the sale price of any business, but when a business i s for 
sale , t he arms-length bargaining process permits both t he 
buyer and t he se ller to be satis f ied with the f inal arrangement; 
otherwise , . the s ale is not consummated. In the case of t he 
shift of r esources occasioned by customs union, t he injured 
person would have no . choice in relinquishing his busine ss. 
However diffi cul t the pr oblem of equity is when resource 
flow is altered , lt must be met if a ·nation i s to follo ~ , 
the criterion of the greatest good for the greate st · number. 
otherwis e fear or the i mpairment of the posi t ion of some 
indiv1duals could lead to economic stagnation. During t he 
period of adjustmen t brought about by customs union ther e 
may be acute di stress. In the transition period, whi ch may 
b e long or short, firms a~e forced to terminate their 
operations; prosperous towns gradually · fade away; vested 
interests shriek as they lose markets; and the political 
structure is shaken.- ·• Of course, the rate at which the 
transition is accomplished may be made slow, but not 
sufficiently slow to satisfy all the people. Unfortunately, 
it seems that nature has implacably imposed upon mankind 
this issue. of conflict of interest between the group and 
the individual. Nations which resis~most steadfast!~ 
changes necessitated by the need for efficiency inexorably 
lose power relative to their less intractable neighbors. 
The ancient Greek Atomists recognized the essence of this 
fact in their philosophy of perpetual change. 
6. Conclusion 
outstanding to the reader of this chapter should b e the 
inconclusive nature of the findings. Even if one is prepared 
to state a strong pr eference for liberalism or conservatism, 
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or for free trade or protectionism, one can not m1hesitatingly 
advocate or oppose customs union on the basis of e conomi c 
analysis. In the case of a particular customs union, quantitative 
study of the speci fi c data provides more evidence fo r an 
opinio~ . In no case, however, can a sensible conclusion for 
or against cus toms union be drawn without serious , detailed 
study . 
CHAPTER IV 
THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET 
In this chapter the proposed European Common Market , 
which is perhaps the most ambitious cus toms union und ertaking 
ever seriously considered, is described and evaluated . The 
reader will note that the economics of the two preceding 
chapt ers is us ed as a framework £or the discussion . Naturally 
it is not poss ible to do more in this paper than to raise 
pertinent questions fundamental to an understanding of t he 
nat ure of the Common Market. Answers to the ques t i ons 
would involve both a means of weighting the relevant va r iables 
and an e labor ate survey to provide estimates of the s ize o£ 
t he variables . In the classroom the teacher will do we ll 
if he guide s his students to ask the right questions about 
a topic as involved and as controversial as cus toms union. 
1. Brief Description o£ the 
European Common Market 
Si x EUropean nat·ion·s; '!{. ·.German;y, Belgium, the Netherl ands, 
Italy, France , and Luxembourg, with a combined population of . 
about one hund~ed sixty four million people , are currently 
negotiating a customs union. It is to be a partial customs 
union, inasmuch as it will exclude agriculture. 
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On the other 
hand, the agreement transcends the ordinary customs union 
since it includes unification of the internal economic 
policy of the participating nations. To ease the dislocations 
of the transitional period and to facilitate investment, 
a central fund is to be established jointly by the member 
countries. The common tariff schedule to be erecterl against 
the outside world is to be no higher than the current average 
of t he six participating nations. All countrie.s 1111ng to 
agree t o t he r ule s of the Common Market a!•e to be admitted. 
Policy ·is to be negotiated initially by a · council of Ministers; 
a Commission, an As sembly, and a Court will oo~pri se 
permanent governing machinery for the Common Marke t. 
An effor t has been made in the negotiations b et ween : the 
countries t o r ender the carrying out of the agreemeilta on 
tariff r eductions automatic and inevitable. Reduct i ons will 
be made in internal duties at stated inte r vals over a t we lve-
to fifteen-year ·period. It is recognized tha t particula r 
industrial and sectional interests will be hurt by the 
economic integrations. (Indeed, · if no inter ests ;vere hurt, 
the goals of the Common Market could not be met.) To mi tigate 
the injury to member · nations, the manner in which each nation 
reduces it s tariffs is to be determined by the nation itself. 
Each nation must, however, keep its a ver age t a.ri.ff reductions 
within five percent of the agreed-upon schedule. At the end 
o.f t he twe l ve- to fi.fteBn-year period, all i nt ernal tariffs 
. i 
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will be zero and no other constraints to trade will continue 
to exis t within the Common Market. 
The Common Market countries are also entertaining the 
possib i lity of becoming part of a free-trade area with a 
larger g~oup of European nations. In a free-trade area no 
internal tariffs exist, but member nations retain control 
of t he duti e s they set up against nations outs1de . the free -
trade area. 
2. Balance of Power and the 
European Common Market 
Effect on the United States and its allies.-- It has 
been said that the primary motivation of great powers in 
for.ming customs union has generally been political, while 
!I that of smaller countries has ordinarily been economic. 
It i s appropriate, therefore , to begin a discussion of the 
European Common Market for American students with a presentation 
of the manner in which the organization may affect the 
positions of' the United States and its allies in t heir 
power struggle with the communistic countries. The European 
· Common Market concept had its inception in 1947 i n an at tempt 
to i mplement the United States' Marshall Plan goal of a joint 
recovery program for Western Europe. Spokesmen for the 
United States, protectionists and free traders alike , favored 
1/ Op. ci§., p.35. 
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the creation of an European customs union. fuat are the 
prevailing American opinions now? 
There is general American agreement that the United 
States needs strong allies in its struggle against communism 
' , 
but there are doubts concerning what kind of an ally that 
is likely to arise in the Common Market. Assuming that the 
Common Market i 'nproves the economies and the power positions 
of the participants, what is the liklihood that an organization 
consisting of a powerful Germany; a sick France; a small, but 
potent Benelux; and a poor Italy will be a reliable friend 
of the United states? This question is particularly 
pertinent in view of the statements by Chancellor Adenauer 
that a 'third force» is desirable in Europe. (Dr. Adenauer 
expressed this view in speeches delivered September 27, 1956 
and october 1, 1956 in Brussels and Hamburg, respectively.) 
Also, Germany's past history leaves some question of the 
readiness of the German people to work for the strengthening 
of free government. In this connection, it is disturbing to 
note that one of the strongest reasons for the continued 
European interest in the customs union is a growing dissatisfaction 
with t he United States. More will be said about the reasons 
for the discontent with American policy later in this chapter. 
With its vast economic power, the United States is 
capable of exereising a strong influence upon the six countries 
to induce them to fo rm an organization which will serve both 
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themselves and the cause of free government. Part of the 
price that America must pay for such leadership i s a lowering 
of its barriers to trade. From the economic point of view, 
the United States would be benefited from increased trade. 
From the viewpoint of sel;f'-su.fficiency, there would be a 
loss as high-cost, relatively inefficient American indus t ries 
we r e driven out of business by foreign goods. 
Balance of power considerations force the United States 
to weigh the i mpact of the EUropean Common Market on other 
American allies which v~uld not be among the member nations. 
For example, the r emoval of tariffs internal to the Common 
Market would displace Japanese trade. Even more densely 
populated than Europe, Japan mus~ trade to exist. Since 
the United States adamantly opposes Japanese t rade with the 
Asiatic mainland, this country would be forced to increase 
its own trade with Japan to compensate for that lost as a 
result of the formation of the Common Market. 
In summary, the balance of power consequences of' the 
establishment of the European Common Market for the United 
states is not unequivocal. The problem for the United States 
is the striking of some sort of balance between the needs of 
self-sufficiency in case of war and the necessity of creating 
a s trong, dependable ally in Europe. There is no doubt that 
without the friendship of the Common Market countries the 
milit ary position of the United States would be seriously 
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imperiled. 
3. ~conomic Aspects of the Common Market 
¥hat economic conditions can be expected to characterize 
the Co~~on Market? To answer this question t he material of 
Chapter II can be used to advantage. The reader will recall 
that in Chapter II the question of the advantage of free trade 
in a cust oms union was asked in regard to each member country 
considered separately, fo r all member countrie s combined , for 
the outside world, and for the world as a whole. In t he 
case of the European Common Market, the United s t a tes is 
primari ly concerned with the economic effects on the Common 
Marke t taken as a whole and on that part of the outside world 
which is· sympathetic to free government. It i s convenient 
f irst to give attention to the probable effects on the Co~~on 
Market area considered as a whole. 
Free-trade a spects of the Con~on Market.-- Of pre-eminent 
llnportance from a free-trade point of view, are the vast 
differences in t he relative efficiencies of competing plants 
in various countries of the Common Market. It can confi dently 
be expected that very great increases in productivity will 
result , for example, as low-cost German industries di splace 
their high-cost French counterparts. As a matter of fact, 
the difference s i n the efficiencies of industries in those 
t wo countries are so great that the effects of the removal 
of tariffs are apt to be staggering • . ~ Very · . little less than 
a social revolution seems to be in the offing. Among the 
various countries in the Common Market, there are a large 
number of industria s that are competitive. It follows· from 
the discussion of Chapter IIIthat the larger the number of 
competitive rather than complementary industries, the more 
important the free-trade aspects. of customs union. Another 
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free-trade portent is the large land area ·eneompassed by the 
Common Market. · In general the larger the land area contained 
in a customs union, the greater is the benefit . that can · be 
expected to aecrue from division of labor. This is true 
because the distribution of resources is ·more varied in , a 
large than ·: in a small land area. All of. the above factors 
lead to free-:trade benefits for the nations which participate 
in the common Market. Furthermore , much effort has gone into 
contractural agreements to avoid, at least superficially, 
tendencies that might develop toward protecti.onism. 
One · contractural effort to avoid protection tendencies 
is the external tariff plan. On the surface it would seem 
that the provision to set the tariff schedule no higher than 
the average of the tariffs of the individual nations, · would 
guard against protection. As was pointed out in Chapter III, 
however, one cannot be very confident that such an average 
tariff stipulation will actually prevent protectionism. In 
the first place, .. it is impossible to measure tariff averages 
b ecause of the nature of the index-number problem. Secondly, 
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depending upon which tariffs are raised and which are lowered 
in arriving at the average, the net effect can on balance 
be protectionistic or otherwise . Thirdly, in the evolution 
of the Common Market, great pressures will arise to save 
high-cost industries to which there are attached venerable 
traditions. Under the circumstances, one would expect an 
inevitable tendency to relax the free-trade safeguards. 
Initially the United States exercised much influence to make 
the Common Market tend toward free trade. A continuing 
pressure on the part of the United States will probably 
be r equired to prevent a subversion of the free trade 
character of the organization. As the discussion below 
indicates, there are serious reasons for believing that 
American leadership will not be equal to the task of guiding 
the future of the Common Market. 
In this connection, there is little doubt that the 
formation of the Common Market will create an entity over 
which the United States will have less influence than it 
now has on the individual member countries. The Common 
Market, as an economic organization, will be able to 
negotiate from a position of strength. It will have a high 
degree of monopoly on some types of goods that cannot be 
produced efficiently outside its borders. Wi th its monopoly 
power it will be able to do much to · adjust its tariffs to 
improve its ter ms of trade. In other words, it will have 
considerable power to adjust international prices in its 
own f avor if it wishes to do so. Perversely, the economic 
power of the Common Market could be used to isolate it as 
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a very-large, crucially-important area of high protection. 
No turn of evenmin the international economic sphere would 
b e much more detrimental to the United States. 
4. Influence of the United 
States on the Co~~on Market 
United States' desires for the Common Market.-- How is 
the United States exercising its leadership to bring about 
a desirable evolution of the European Common Market? What 
would the United States like to accomplish by its influence 
on the organization? The second question is relatively simple 
to answer in t erms of broad generalities. The Uni ted States 
is vitally interested in strengthening its allies through 
economic prosperity and stability. It would like its allies 
to achie ve compatibility, if not cohesion, on the part of 
their governments. The Common Market is a device that can 
assis t in the attainment of these ends for its members . In 
the process of strengthening European allies, America can 
not ignore · its allies in other parts of the world. Impairments 
of their trade position must not become . severe as a result 
of t he European Co~mon Market. Finally, the United States 
is concerned with the effect of the Common Market on its own 
roreign trade. It is the above desiderata that the United 
States would like to protect thro 1~h its iorluence on the 
Com...mon Market. 
United States influence and its use.-- The power of 
Amer ican influence on international trade is enormous~ It 
i s by long odds the most important nation in world t rade . 
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In 1957 the value of American export, imports, and foreign 
manufacturing was the impressive amount of f i fty seven billion ];/ 
dolla rs . This amount is three times the gross national 
produ ct of India. Foreign manufactur ers look to the massive 
Ameri can consumer market with rapt attention. There is no 
consumer market as large and enticing anywhere in the world. 
The i nfluence of the United States is further enhanced by the 
aid programs upon which the nation has embar ked. 
Returning to the question of how the Unit ed St ates is 
using i ts influence to achieve the conditions it de sires 
in t he Europe an Common Market, one finds the answer i s hardly 
reassur ing . For ten years a protectionist politi cal t ide 
has been growing in the United States. Congress, during 
this per i od, has persistently criticized Ameri can t rade 
pol i cy a s being t oo liberal and has unswervingly ref us ed 
to permi t negotiat i on of across-the-board t ariff redu ctions 
of the amount r eques ted by Ameri can allies. To make matters 
wol"'Se , Congress has adamantly followed a policy of extending 
A a evenson, "Speech on World Trad~" New York Times, 
Mar ch 28, 1958), Volume l07, Number 36,588:12 (Columns 4, 5, 
6, 7 , and 8). 
existing trade agreements for short periods only, thereby 
drastically curtailing the investment time horizon of 
55 
foreign manufacturers who wish to sell to the American 
market. Congress will have no part of American participation 
in the Common Market. 
Recent history of United States' foreign trade policy.-• 
The most liberal trade position attained by the United States 
followed the 1945 Trade Agreements Act, which permitted the 
President to reduce tariffs fifty percent below the r a tes 
that existed January 1, 1945. Early in 1947 the administration 
negotiat ed the first of four multilateral trade agreements, 
which was called the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
This agreement was abbreviated GATT. One year later when the 
agreement was on the agenda for renewal, it was proposed 
again for one year only with a "peril point" amendment. The 
"pe r il point" proviso stipulated t hat prior to the beginning 
of any trade agreement conferences, a Tariff Commis sion will 
report to the Pr~sident as "to the limit to wnich such 
modification, imposition or continuance" of tariff s may be 
impos ed without "causing or threatening serious injury to 
the domestic industry producing like or directly competitive 
articles. 11 (This quotation is from the 1955 Act, 84th, 
Congress, fir s t session, PQblic Law 86~) The ' President is 
obliged to submit a full report to Congress if he lowers 
tariffs below sueh limits. In 1948 the measure was passed 
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without the "peril point" runendment. Three years lat er in 
1951, the "peril point" amendment became part of the law 
when the bill was renewed. At that time an nescape clause" 
diluted the effectiveness of the bill even more. The ~escape 
clause" was to Paise any tariff on an imported good which 
causes or even threatens the domestic competitive industry 
with serious injury. In other words, the law was enacted 
to protect high-cost, ineffici ent American industry and to 
nullify the advantages of fre e t r ade whether or not the 
national security was involved. 
Not until 1951 had EUrope recovered sufficiently from 
World War II to become a serious competitor in most fields 
of trade. At that time the American government moved 
i~~ediately to prevent foreign trade from competing seriously 
with American industry. In effect Congress failed to recognize 
that foreign political policy and foreign trade policy overlap 
to the extent that they are inextricable in their consequences. 
By 1954 the administration, recognizing the protectionist 
tenor of Congress, asked for a very modest tariff-lowering 
prerogat~ve. The President did not ask for general tariff-
schedule reduction power. He stressed, instead, the continued 
use of' the escape clause and the 11peril point" constraint, 
and he couched his appeal in guarded terms to avoid a clash 
with the protectionists. Even this watered-down program was 
too much for Congress to accept. Accordingly, the following 
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ye ar Congress narrowed the "peril point" and 1escape clause" 
to extend their applicability to any segment or any industry 
that is threatened. In the same year the United States 
insisted, during a renegotiation or GATT, upon r eserving 
the right to establish import fees and quotas pursuantto 
Section twenty-two of the Agricultural Adjustment Act. 
Strong .forces make the United States a protectionist 
countri·-- strong forces prevail in the United States to 
cause the nation to be protectionist in its outlook. Vested 
interests with much wealth at their disposal mold public 
opinion through advertising, publications, and speeches. 
Wide-spread lack of und erstanding of economics is a 
characteristic of the electorate. The nation has a long 
history o.f isolationism. Respected people in positions of 
leadership seem to fail to comprehend the international 
trade problem. An example of lack of understanding is a 
statement made by Bernard M. Baruch, "Let the United States 
say to all the world that hereafter we will conduct absolutely 
free trade with any country in the world that meets our wage 
];/ 
and social s tandards." Members of Congress are elected to 
represent sections of the country, and national and sectional 
interests are often extremely disparate~ Underlying much of 
the popular thinking about the working of fr ee enterprise is 
1/ The American Tariff League, Inc., The United States in 
World Trade, A Contemporary Analysis and a Program for the 
FUture, New York, 1958, p.97. 
an uncritical faith that each individual, by pursuing his 
individual good, automatically contributes to the well-being 
of society. 
Russian awareness of trade possibilities.-- In sh~rp 
contrast to the apathy shown by the government of the 
United States in the use of foreign trade as a means of 
enhancing the development of conditions it favors in Europe, 
is the keen : awareness of the .Soviet Union of the usefulness 
of trade as a tool of diplomacy. Before his death, Stalin 
told the Soviets that the success of world Communism would 
hinge on Western Germany and Japan, both of which countries 
would be lost to the United States because of greedy 
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!I protectionist policy. Although it still continues to stress 
self-sufficiency within its own borders and those of its 
satelites, Russia has increased its trade and aid arrangements 
greatly with Asiatic and Middle East countrtes since 1956. 
The Russians have been willing to purchase surpluses not 
easily sold, and they have offered easy credit terms with 
payment in soft currencies. Much of the Russian trade has 
not been profitable in the economic sense. Instead it has 
been more a disguised form of aid calculated to win the 
friendship and approbation of ba ckward countries which the 
soviets wish to lure into their orbit. American obs ervers 
have recently expressed growing concern as to the effect 
on the Common Market of the f'uture role of Soviet trade. 
!/ Adlai E. s€evenson, op. cit., p. 54. 
5. Summary 
In summary it is extremely difficult to predict the 
course that the European Common Market will take over the 
next few years. With United States influence waning as 
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its foreign trade policy continues a ten-year protectionist 
bent and with soviet trade policy just beginning to make 
itself felt, it is anyone's guess how the fabric of Common 
Market history will be woven. All the world is conjecturing 
as to whether the six member nations will be able to submerge 
their differences enough to carry out their proposed union. 
once the Common Market becomes a going entity, if it does, 
is the economic union likely to lead to greater political 
union? In the next chapter this general question, i.e., 
whether economic union generally precedes and paves the way 
for political unio~ or vice versa, is discussed in an 
historical context. 
CHAPTER V 
HISTORICAL DISCUSSION ON THE EVOLUTION OF CUSTOMS UNION 
Re peatedly in the previous chapter the conclusions 
regarding the future course of the Common Market have been 
inderinite. To attempt to shed a bit more light upon the 
subject, it is appropriate to terminate this study with a 
discussion of what conclusions, if any, may be drawn from 
the history of customs union. The inclusion .·-.of history 
in the classroom discussion of the Common Market provides 
the te a cher with a good opportunity to introduce his students 
to that popular concept, the economic interpretation of 
history. The question around which the historical 
treatment is presented in this chapter is whether or not the 
economic union of the Common Market is likely to lead to 
political union. Stated more generally the question is: 
nnoe s economic union precede poll tical union, or is the 
opposite sequence of events to be expected.? 11 • The : reina~nae:r 
of this chapter serves as a possible framework for classroom 
presentation of the subject. 
Two historical opinions of sequence of union.-- As early 
as 1665 Johann J. Becher, an Austrian mercantilist, attempting 
to influence the formation of a customs urii:on among Austria, 
Bavaria, and Spai~ expressed the notion that economic 
-60-
61 
. cooperation leads to political friendship: •The union of 
he arts comes into being immediately upon one person helping 
another to prosperity, and becomes strengthened if the aim 
is to establish a perpetual increase and community of riches. 
Nothing is s.tror.ge.p than this bond, since no cunning and not y 
even a bloody sword can dissolve it.~ Conversely, Frederich 
List, the great German espouser of nationalism, held just 
the opposite view. A quotation from his writing ll1the 
~ 
middle of the nineteenth century express es his position: 
"The popular school has assumed as being actually 
in existence a state of things which has yet to come 
into existence. It assumes a universal union and a 
state of perpetual peace, and deduce s therefrom the 
great benefits of free trade. In this manner it 
con.founds effects with causes. Among the provinces 
and the st ates which are alre ady politically united, 
the r e exists a stat e of perpetual peace; from this 
political union originates their commercial union, 
and it is in consequence of the perpetual peace t hus 
maintained that the commercial union has become so 
beneficial to them. All examples which history can 
show are those in which the political union has l ed 
the way, and the commercial has followed. Not a 
single instance can be adduced in which the l atter 
has taken the lead, and the former has grown up from 
it . " 
List did not equivocate inasmuch as he characterized his 
statement not merely as an observation, but as an historical 
law. 
Since Frederich List wrote the above statement, the 
1/ Jacob Viner, Ibid., p. 33. 
g! Frederich List, The National System of Political Economy, 
Sampson s. Lloyd, New York, 1964, PP• 102-103. 
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most important customs union or all time, the German 
Zollverein, has transgressed his "historical law. 11 It is 
worthwhile to describe brierly the history or the Zollverein 
ror a number or reasons. In the rirst place, the role or 
Prussia, the powerful organizer of the Zollverein, can be used 
to illustrate the importance of the influence of a strong 
country, both economically and politically, on the fo r mation 
of a c11stoms union. In view or America's lack or l eadership 
on the Common Market, Prussia's influence on the Zollverein 
is especially interesting. Secondly, the Zollverein provides 
actual historical data of the amount of political cohesiveness 
which attended that particular customs union. Finally, the 
Zollverein is an interesting customs union ~ ~· Upon it 
most of ·the g~neralizations employed by modern writers on 
the Common Market have been based. 
1. The Zollverein 
As early as 1811 Prussia began to think s eriously in 
t erms of customs union with the enclave German states wholly 
within her borders. At the time Prussia was still smarting 
from the defeats she had suffered from the French. The 
Junkers viewed a customs union as a fi r st step in extending 
their power to a larger area. From 1819 to 1831 Prussia 
negotiated customs union with the enclave states, baiting 
them with a generously-low tariff, wluch was very appealing 
economically, and coercing them with a heavy schedule of 
of transit duties. Completely surrounded by Prussia, the 
enclave states had to ship all goods destined for export 
over Prussian territory. The transit duties were levies 
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they had to pay for the privilege. By 1831 all the enclaye 
states were included in the customs union. None of them had 
shared with Prussia in the compilation of their joint tariff 
schedule. From 1828 through 1867 Prussia negotiated with 
the larger, more important German states outside of Prussian 
territory. For them the terms were more libe ral than for the 
enclave states. Each of them voluntarily accepted all tariff 
arrangements. The agreements which they signed with Prussia 
included a provision for prohibition of tariff changes except 
by mutual consent of all member nations. Allocation of 
customs revenues was amicably settled by agreement. Very 
generous distributions were made to some of the weaker states . 
Furthermore, each stat e retained its own tariff administration 
under a common code with all other member states. By 1867 
only the free cities of Hamburg and Bremen were outside the 
Zollverein. 
Throughout the long period of negotiations when, t he 
Zollverein was taking shape, the Austrians were extremely 
interested in joining the organization. They made a series 
of attempts to hold diplomatic conferences with Prussia fo r 
the purpose of joining. Prussia constantly frustrated the 
Austrian overtures, because Prussia regarded Austria as a 
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competitor to be bested in the power struggle. Much of the 
generosity that Prussia displayed to the weaker members of 
the customs union was motivated by a desire to ke ep them out 
of the Austrian sphere of influence. Prussia adro~tly kept 
the tariff so low in the Zollverein that it acted as a 
deterrent to Austrian aspirations to join the organization. 
Finally, in desperation, Austria formed a competing customs 
union. Tension grew between the two powerful countries until 
it re ached a climax in 1866 in the Seven Weeks War. 
Importance of Prussian influence on the Zollverein.-- The 
importance of the activity of Prussia in the formation of the 
Zollverein cannot be overemphasized. Prussia was willing 
to lower her tariffs to a degree unmatched by any other 
important European power. The government of the country did 
not flinch at the internal effect of the high level of free 
trade engendered by the low tariff schedule. The Junkers and 
their ministers unceasingly labored to complete their customs 
union over a thirty-five-year period. Their goal was the 
long-term goal of unification of the German states in a 
political entity in which they would be dominant. There is 
little doubt that in the Zollverein, economic union preceded, 
and paved the way for, political union. 
Polit i ca l cohesiveness of Zollverein states .• -- Nevertheless, 
the extent of political cohesiveness which ensued from the 
Zollverein should not be overrated. In the Seven Weeks var 
of 1866, most of the Zollverein states fought as allies of 
the Austrians against the Prussians, while the free cities 
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of Hamburg, Luebeck, and Bremen, and the state of Oldenburg, 
all cutside the Zollverein, fought as allies of Prussia. 
This turn of events corroborated Bismark's feeling of 
impatience with the slow progress toward political unity 
under the Zollverein. 
Subsequent to her victory, Prussia ceased to tolerate 
the more or leas equal participation of the less-powerful 
member states of the Zollverein .;.in the formulation of 
' 
customs policy. Prussia demanded the l argest number of votes 
in a newly-established customs council as well as the right 
of veto. To Prussia went the privilege of representing 
the zollerverein in tariff negotiations with foreign countries. 
Also, the right of each of the states to maintain its own 
administration of duty levies and collections was abrogated 
in favor of a central Zollverein authority. 
Political unification of Germany.~- Fina~ political 
unification· of Germany was consummated during the great wave 
of nationalistic fervor that followed victory in the Franco-
Prussian War of 1870. Thus, it appears that although the 
cus toms . union laid a foundation for p.o1itical ·unif'icat1on 
in Germany, other powerful forces were working in the same 
direction . Con:trary to the allegation of Frederich List 
that "political union has led the way and that commercial 
(union) has followed,n the Zollverein provides an example 
of just the opposite succession of events. 
2. Sequence of Political 
and Economic Union 
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Economics is seldom a strong motivation to union.-- The 
above example of the Zollverein notwithstanding, there are 
not many cases of economic union preceding political union. 
As a matter of fact, within major countries in which various 
r egions are politically bound together by durable ties, 
economic policy often acts as a strongly devisive vexation. 
A little reflection is enough to lend credence to the List 
hypothesis that political union precedes economic union. 
Vfuereever economic matters are involved, competition exists 
in one form or another, and competition is no respecter of 
pe r sons. It weakens friendly relations by creating conflicts 
of interest, and it creates great fringe areas of questionable 
business ethics. Political ' ties are less likely to encompass 
elemenrnas internecine as economic ties. In politics there is 
strength in numbers; in business there is usually weakness 
' in numbers because of competition. The uneven distribution 
of resourc e s in a country creates economic conflict of interest 
among different regions. Human emotions tend to make 
poltical union more appealing than economic union. There 
is something noble_, in most people's estimation, in the 
self-sacrifice possible and necessary to support the lofty 
values of nationalism. On the contrary, economic issues 
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are wi thout appeal for the mos t part, and hard to understand 
more than superficially. When not treated in glamorized and 
overly-simplified form, economics dulls most people's senses. 
Diffe rences between nineteent!rand twentieth-cen tury 
conditions.-- Before concluding this short discussion of 
the possibility of using history to gain insight into the 
European Common Market, it is desirable to note some of the 
differences betwe en circumstances that confront twentie th-
century customs unions and their nineteenth-century counterparts. 
Perhaps the mos t important twentieth-century change is t he 
rise of nationalistic sentiment. The con cept of total war 
is one manifestation of the modern kind of nationalism . Just 
as war has become more all-embracing, so have the economic 
controls imposed ·by national governments. Until the demise 
of the gold standard in the early nineteen thirties , 
international trade was facilitiated by a . world-wide sy s tem 
which used gold as a standard of value. During t he gr eat 
de pr e ss ion .of the early thirties, the nations of the world 
discontinued the gold standard to enable themselves to control 
thei r dome s tic e conomies more tightly. With the removal of 
the gold standard, competitive conditions lessened B;Ild 
international markets became controlled markets. As a 
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consequence, it is more difficult now for national e conomies 
to adj ust to changes in volumes of f oreign imports. Prices 
have become inflexible; exchange .ra:t .es are-- often artifi cially 
controlled; wage rate s are set by agreement rather than by 
compe t ition; and. concepts of fair pric C;:ls have .. become 
i mpor tant. 
Several important inducements to the formation of customs 
unions in the nineteenth century no longer exist • Among these 
are transit duties of the sort which Prussia us ed to co rce 
other German s ta tes to join the Zollverein. It is now 
i n t ernational practice for nations to permit the shipment 
of foreign goods across their territory free of financi a l 
encumbrance if the goods are intended for a third nation . 
In other wor ds, imports which are intended for r e - export 
are exempt ed f rom payment of tariffs. Another nineteenth-
century inducement to customs union was the "most-favored 
nation" proviso in international trade. The "most-favored 
nation " agreement guaranteed to all nations, with which the 
pact had been signed, the benefit of the lowest tariff 
charged to any country on any commodity. In the nineteenth 
century most nations valued the agreement very highly. 
Because of the peculiar manner in which diplomacy of the 
period evolved, any country could lower its tariff structure 
preferentially without abrogat ing the _.most-favored nation 11 
agreement by joining a customs union. In the t wentieth cent ury 
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the l'fmost-favored nation" agreement h a s become less important. 
As a matter of f act, the International Trade Organization 
has made a practice of approving special agreements between 
countries concerning matters of trade. Consequently, the 
customs union has lost its importance as a device for 
circumventing the "most-favored nation" clause. 
Perhaps the most important twentieth-century change 
affecting the formation of cus toms union is the greater 
degr ee of central planning that now exists in most of the 
nations of the world. Even the most capitalistic countries 
now use monetary and fiscal policy devices to less en the 
amplitude of the business cycle. Social security, unemployment 
compensation, coll e ctive bargaining inducements, and farm 
support programs all tend to require control of foreign 
trade. These twentieth-century social arrangements make 
it much more difficult for nations to form customs unions. 
3 . Concluding Comment 
In a study as brief as this thesis it is not f easible 
to do much mo r e than allude to one possible historical 
tre a tment of customs union. It would be pos s ible to develop 
a much more detailed discussion of the sequence of political 
and economic union, drawing upon examples from the present 
century as well as the last century. However, the aim of 
this chapter is to demonstrate an historical approach to 
the teaching of the subject and to indicate·changed circumstances 
that customs union races in present-day Europe. It is 
doubtful if a more extensive historical treatment of the 
subject would add much to the student's underst anding of 
the issues, unless a great deal more time was devoted to 
it. 
If the reader is disturbed at the continued equivocal 
nature of the answers broached to the various Co~mon Market 
questions raised in this thesis, he should recall that the 
purpose of the study is to present a background for teaching 
students to understand the issue and its implications. A 
thesis that would attempt to answer the questions would be 
quit e a different sort of study. 
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